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Abstract
Background: The primary aim of this study was to explore how metacognition, as implicated in Wells and
Matthews’ metacognitive theory of emotional disorder, might relate to the concept of mindfulness, and whether
metacognition or mindfulness best predicted symptoms of emotional disorder.
Methods: Data was collected from 224 community controls on the Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ),
the Metacognitions Questionnaire-30 (MCQ-30), the Patient Health Questionnaire 9-item (PHQ-9), the Generalized
Anxiety Disorder 7-item (GAD-7), and the Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory Revised (OCI-R).
Results: The MCQ-30 and FFMQ subscales constituted two latent factors which appeared to assess metacognition and
mindfulness. The FFMQ subscales nonjudging of inner experience and acting with awareness loaded on metacognition,
while observing, nonreacting to inner experience and describing formed a unique mindfulness factor. Metacognition
correlated strongly with symptoms of depression, anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorder. Regression analyses
found metacognition to be an important predictor of symptoms explaining between 42 % and 49 % of the variance
when controlling for age and gender, while mindfulness was a weaker predictor explaining between 0 % and 2 % of
the variance in symptoms.
Conclusions: The structure amongst scales and the pattern of correlations with symptoms were generally consistent
with the metacognitive theory which focuses on metacognitive beliefs, enhancing awareness of thoughts and
disengaging extended processing.
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Background
Psychological treatments develop in parallel and some of
their therapeutic interventions and constructs may overlap
or share elements. Exploring and clarifying the relation
between potentially related constructs may be useful be-
cause it may contribute to a better understanding of simi-
larities and differences, which may be essential in both
understanding and developing treatment interventions.
Two recent approaches to treatment are represented by
the metacognitive model (Wells and Matthews 1994, Wells
2009) and mindfulness-based therapies (Kabat-Zinn 1994).
Each use strategies aimed at directly changing experiential
awareness, but do so in different ways. The metacognitive
perspective is founded on a specific information processing
model of attention and emotion whilst mindfulness draws
on Buddhist principles and techniques. It has been argued
that effective experiential techniques might be grounded in
the metacognitive model in order to conceptualize what
mindfulness is and how it should be developed from an in-
formation processing perspective (Wells 2005). More spe-
cifically, in the metacognitive model, psychological
disorder is related to a style of reacting to thoughts with
sustained processing in the form of worry, rumination, fix-
ation of attention on threat and maladaptive coping behav-
iors, collectively referred to as the Cognitive Attentional
Syndrome (CAS; Wells and Matthews 1994, 1996). The
CAS is the result of the influence of metacognitive beliefs
on cognitive processing. For example, the metacognitive
belief that thoughts are dangerous and/or uncontrollable
leads to sustained negative thinking and entanglement with
them.
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Theory and research on metacognition evolved from
developmental- and cognitive psychology (e.g., Flavell
1979; Nelson 1996; Nelson and Narens 1994). Metacog-
nition was originally defined as knowledge or beliefs
about thinking and strategies used to regulate and
control thinking processes (Flavell, 1979). As such meta-
cognition refers to cognition applied to cognition. Meta-
cognition has since been developed as a basis for
understanding and treating psychological disorders
(Wells and Matthews, 1994; 1996). In this metacognitive
theory of emotional disorders it is argued that disorder
is associated with a non-specific style of thinking termed
CAS. According to the theory, much of the knowledge
on which processing depends is metacognitive in nature.
So the activation and persistence of the CAS in response
to stressors is dependent on maladaptive metacognitive
knowledge (beliefs). When we refer to metacognitions in
the current study, we refer to metacognitions as specified
in this metacognitive model of emotional disorders and
as operationalized by the Metacognitions Questionnaire-
30 (MCQ-30). For a detailed theoretical discussion on
metacognition in general (not restricted to Wells’ meta-
cognitive model) and mindfulness confer Jankowski and
Holas (2014).
Within a different theoretical framework, mindfulness,
has gained extensive import into the therapeutic domain
through the adoption of meditation practices. In this trad-
ition mindfulness has been defined as “the awareness that
emerges through paying attention on purpose, in the
present moment, and nonjudgmentally to the unfolding of
experience moment by moment” (Kabat-Zinn 2003, p.
145). As noted by Jankowski and Holas (2014) the abun-
dance of meanings related to the term mindfulness makes
it difficult to define. In the current study mindfulness is
understood and operationalized according to the FFMQ.
According to FFMQ mindfulness is a multifaceted con-
struct which could be defined as: attending to internal and
external experiences, labelling internal experiences with
words, attending to the present moment, taking a nonjud-
ging stance toward thoughts and feelings, and not getting
caught up in thoughts and feelings.
To practice mindfulness is to be aware of what is go-
ing on in the present moment. It is the opposite of act-
ing on “autopilot”, where the present moment is biased
by routinized and habitual thoughts and feelings. While
practicing mindfulness, a person will experience the
present moment as the direct experience of the body
and sensory input. Meditation is used as a tool to de-
velop the state, or the skill of mindfulness. Emotional
disorders could possibly be understood as a lack of
mindfulness skills in the mindfulness-based approach.
However, there is a lack of theory to offer a good explan-
ation as to the mechanisms of mindfulness, but there
are indications that mindfulness could be useful in
managing cognitive vulnerability and reduce the chance
of relapse in depression (Segal et al. 2013). In contrast,
in the metacognitive model emotional disorders are seen
as the result of fixed ways of coping with negative
thoughts through repetitive negative thinking. Disorder
does not result from a state of mindlessness or ‘auto-
pilot’ instead it results from excessive motivated efforts
to deal with negative thoughts with the CAS. Metacogni-
tive therapy has developed specific techniques such as
detached mindfulness (Wells and Matthews 1994, Wells
2005), which is a reaction to thoughts that is the oppos-
ite of the CAS, involving standing back and not reacting
or trying to deal with them but remaining flexible with
low levels of ideation. This ability is aimed to strengthen
metacognitive beliefs such as knowing what a thought is
and that it is a benign inner event that is separate from
the control of action. See Wells (2005) for a closer de-
scription of detached mindfulness and its similarities
and differences from mindfulness.
Recent analyses have attempted to differentiate and as-
sess the components of mindfulness and link them
meaningfully with different psychological factors. The
concept of mindfulness has been operationalized with
the Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ; Baer
et al. 2006), based on a factor analysis of independently
developed questionnaires for measuring mindfulness. A
systematic review of instruments to measure self-
reported mindfulness found that the FFMQ has the best
psychometric properties (Park et al. 2013). The higher
the scores on the FFMQ the better mental health the in-
dividual is thought to have. The five facets of FFMQ are:
observing, describing, acting with awareness, nonjudging
of inner experience, and nonreacting to inner experience.
Observing includes attending to or noticing experiences,
either internal or external such as cognitions, emotions
or various sensory perceptions (e.g. “I pay attention to
how my emotions affect my thoughts and behavior”).
Describing refers to being able to put internal experi-
ences into words (e.g. “I’m good at finding words to de-
scribe my feelings”). Acting with awareness is the
tendency to attend to what you’re doing at the moment,
as opposed to “going on automatic pilot” (e.g. “When I
do things, my mind wanders off and I’m easily dis-
tracted”). Nonjudging of inner experience refers to being
able to not evaluate thoughts and feelings as good or
bad (e.g. “I criticize myself for having irrational or in-
appropriate emotions” [reverse scoring]). Nonreacting to
inner experience refers to the ability to let thoughts and
emotions come and go without being caught up in or
reacting to them (e.g. “I watch my feelings without get-
ting lost in them”) (Baer et al. 2008).
Baer et al. (2006) showed that nonjudging of inner ex-
perience and acting with awareness were the subscales
most strongly correlated with psychological symptoms,
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neuroticism, thought suppression and difficulty regulating
emotion, while observing and describing mostly showed
no or weak correlations with these measures. Another
study showed that observing and describing had no correl-
ation to anxiety and depression, while the other three sub-
scales showed weak correlations (Bohlmeijer et al. 2010).
It has also been found that nonjudging of inner experience
predicts lower levels of depression, anxiety and stress,
while acting with awareness predicts lower levels of de-
pression (Cash and Whittingham, 2010).
There are similarities and differences in the concepts
used in metacognitive theory and in meditation derived
practice. The concept of mindfulness as assessed with
the FFMQ (Baer et al. 2006) may be related to the con-
structs of metacognitive beliefs as specified in metacog-
nitive theory (Wells and Matthews 1994). For instance,
items of the FFMQ (e.g. “When I do things my mind
wanders off and I’m easily distracted”) appear to tap
attitudes or beliefs about cognition. In metacognitive
theory of psychological disorder metacognitive beliefs
are assessed with the metacognitions questionnaire
(MCQ; Cartwright-Hatton and Wells 1997; Wells and
Cartwright-Hatton 2004). The MCQ has five subscales:
positive beliefs about worry (e.g. “Worrying helps me
cope”), uncontrollability and danger (e.g. “When I start
worrying I cannot stop”), need to control thoughts (e.g.
“I should be in control of my thoughts all of the time”),
cognitive confidence (e.g. “I do not trust my memory”),
and cognitive self—consciousness (e.g. “I am constantly
aware of my thinking”).
There is both convergence and divergence in the items
of the FFMQ and MCQ. Whilst the FFMQ and MCQ
contain constructs with no apparent overlap, it is clear for
example, that the FFMQ construct of observing overlaps
with MCQ cognitive self-consciousness as they both relate
to an internal focus of attention. However, in the meta-
cognitive model cognitive self-consciousness should be
positively related to troublesome symptoms, while the
mindfulness construct of observing should be negatively
related to troublesome symptoms. However, there might
be differences between experienced and inexperienced
meditators as they have different cerebral activation in re-
sponse to stressors (e.g. Froeliger et al. 2012) and medita-
tion experience could also affect the relationship between
observing and well-being (Baer et al. 2006; 2008).”
It would be useful to establish whether metacognition
correlates with mindfulness and whether mindfulness
and metacognition subscales combine to form latent var-
iables that might predict psychological distress. The pri-
mary aim of the current study was therefore to explore
how metacognition as implicated in metacognitive the-
ory of emotional disorder might relate to the broad con-
cept of mindfulness. We also wanted to examine the
latent structure among factors related to mindfulness
and metacognitions and how this might relate to anxiety,
depressive and obsessive-compulsive symptoms. Because
the constructs may be related in different ways (or not
at all) our goal was exploratory rather than testing a par-
ticular model fit, as we did not wish to impose con-
straints on any meaningful structure that could emerge.
In addition to exploring the latent structure among sub-
scales we examined, post hoc, the relationship between
the latent factors and measures of psychopathology as a
means of provisionally validating emergent constructs.
Methods
Participants and procedure
The sample was 224 Norwegian-speaking participants
between the age of 18 and 67, with a mean age of
31.8 years (SD = 13.0). The sample consisted of 75
(33.5 %) men and 149 (66.5 %) women. In this sample,
39.8 % were employed either part time or full time,
45.1 % were full time students, 1.8 % were part time stu-
dents, and 13.4 % received disability benefits or disability
insurance or were retired or unemployed. Also, 34.4 %
was single, 21.4 % was in a relationship, 38.8 % was mar-
ried or cohabiting, and 5.4 % was divorced or separated.
The data was anonymously collected online through
posts on social media and on public online discussion
forums where people were encouraged to answer and to
share a link to the questionnaires. The majority of par-
ticipants recruited through social media were from the
network of a psychology graduate student, while the dis-
cussion forums were related to psychological health.
Anyone over the age of 18 could participate, and 224
people completed all five questionnaires. The study was
submitted to the Regional Committee for Medical and
Health Research Ethics in Norway for approval. The eth-
ics committee decided that an approval was not neces-
sary as the participants responses were anonyomous.
The study was approved by the Norwegian Social Sci-
ence Data Services (project nr: 33966).
Measurements
Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ; Baer
et al. 2006). The FFMQ uses a 5-point Likert response
scale (1 = never or very rarely true, 5 = very often or al-
ways true). The higher the score on FFMQ the more
mindful a person is and should thus experience less psy-
chological problems. It contains 39 items, where each
facet is represented with seven or eight items each. The
five facets are: observing, describing, acting with aware-
ness, nonjudging of inner experience, and nonreacting to
inner experience. Baer et al. (2006) argue that using a
total score of FFMQ to measure mindfulness will pro-
vide a distorted view of the relationships between mind-
fulness and other concepts, because the subscale scores
of FFMQ measure different aspects of mindfulness that
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should not be collapsed into one. Thus, there is a need
for clarifying the relation between the FFMQ facets. The
Norwegian FFMQ has been validated for use in Norway
(Dundas et al. 2013). In the current study, FFMQ
showed adequate psychometric characteristics with
Cronbach’s alpha on the five facets of 0.80, 0.88, 0.86,
0.92 and 0.80, respectively.
Metacognitions Questionnaire 30 (MCQ-30; Wells
and Cartwright-Hatton 2004). All subscales of the MCQ-
30 have been shown to have positive relationships with
obsessive-compulsive symptoms, pathological worry, and
trait-anxiety. The MCQ-30 uses a 4-point Likert response
scale (1 = do not agree, to 4 agree very much). Higher
scores on MCQ represent higher levels of dysfunctional
metacognitions. The five subscales are: positive beliefs
about worry, uncontrollability and danger, need to control
thoughts, cognitive confidence, and cognitive self—con-
sciousness. MCQ uncontrollability and danger and MCQ
need to control thoughts demonstrate particularly strong
relationships with mood and anxiety disorders (Spada
et al. 2008; Wells and Cartwright-Hatton, 2004). In the
current study, MCQ-30 showed adequate psychometric
characteristics with Cronbach’s alpha on the five subscales
of 0.80, 0.85, 0.80, 0.88 and 0.85, respectively. The MCQ
has been used with subscale factors as well as a total score
as an indication of levels of metacognitions (e.g. Hjemdal
et al. 2013).
Patient Health Questionnaire 9-item (PHQ-9; Spitzer
et al. 1999). The PHQ-9 contains criteria for depression.
The name PHQ-9 refers to the nine items in the ques-
tionnaire, and is based on the nine criteria for diagnos-
ing depression in DSM-IV. Each item is reported on a
four-point Likert scale (0 = not at all, 3 = almost every
day), and the answers refer to the past two weeks. The
PHQ-9 total score is used as a severity measure, and can
range from 0 to 27. It has been shown to have good in-
ternal reliability and test-retest reliability, as well as cri-
terion validity, construct validity and external validity
(Kroenke et al. 2001). In the current study, the PHQ-9
showed adequate psychometric characteristics with a
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.88.
Generalized Anxiety Disorder 7-item (GAD-7; Spitzer
et al. 2006). GAD-7 is based on the DSM-criteria for gen-
eralized anxiety disorder. Each item is reported on a four-
point Likert scale (0 = not at all, 3 = almost every day), and
the answers refer to the past two weeks. The total score
ranges between 0 – 21. It has been shown to have good
reliability, as well as good criterion, construct, factorial
and procedural validity. In the current study, the question-
naire showed adequate psychometric characteristics with
a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.89.
Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory Revised (OCI-R;
Foa et al. 2002). The OCI-R is an 18-item self-report ques-
tionnaire. OCI-R was developed to examine the presence
and severity of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD)
symptoms. Each item is rated on a 5-point Likert scale (0
= not at all, 4 = extremely). The higher the score the
higher the level of OCD symptoms. The total score of the
OCI-R provides information about the OCD severity, but
there are also sub-scores which addresses the severity of
the different types of obsessions and compulsions. There
are six subscales included in the OCI-R: Washing, check-
ing, obsessions, neutralizing, ordering and hoarding. The
score of OCI-R ranges between 0 – 72, and higher scores
indicate higher levels of OCD symptoms. The OCI-R has
been shown to be a valid and reliable diagnostic tool (Foa
et al. 2002). A study with a Norwegian sample found re-
sults supporting the validity of OCI-R (Solem et al. 2010).
In the current study, the measure showed adequate psy-
chometric characteristics with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.90
for the total score.
Statistics
Pearson correlation analyses were used to investigate the
relationship between metacognition and mindfulness.
The relationship between metacognition and mindful-
ness was further explored using Maximum Likelihood
factor analysis with a direct oblimin rotation in which
subscale scores of the MCQ and the FFMQ were used.
After investigating the relationship between metacogni-
tion and mindfulness, the next step was to determine
the independent predictors of symptoms using hierarch-
ical regression analysis. We conducted three regression
analyses. One using symptoms of anxiety as the dependent
variable, the second using symptoms of depression, and
the third using symptoms of OCD as the dependent vari-
able. On the first step we entered gender and age, on the
following steps we entered the factors extracted from the
Maximum Likelihood analysis.
Results
Levels of depression, anxiety, and obsessive-compulsive
symptoms in the sample
The mean score of PHQ-9 was 6.56 (SD = 5.61). The op-
timal cut-off score when using PHQ-9 is often set to 10
points (Manea et al. 2012). Using a cut-off point of 10
and above to describe the current sample; 20.5 % scored
above this cut-off. With regard to severity; 11.1 % re-
ported that their problems with depression made doing
their work, taking care of things at home, or getting
along with other people as “very difficult”, while 2.8 %
reported this as being “extremely difficult”.
In this sample, the mean score of GAD-7 was 5.32 (SD
= 4.61). The cut-off point for ‘caseness’ is a score of 10. In
this sample, 14.8 % scored above cut-off. With regard to
severity, 10.3 % reported that their anxiety problems made
doing their work, taking care of things at home, or getting
Solem et al. BMC Psychology  (2015) 3:24 Page 4 of 10
along with other people as being “very difficult”, while
2.3 % reported this as being “extremely difficult”.
The mean OCI-R score was 10.06 (SD = 9.78). The
recommended cut-off point is 21, with scores at or
above this level indicating the likely presence of OCD
(Foa et al. 2002). In this sample, 11.6 % scored above
cut-off. A summary of the scores on the different instru-
ments are presented in Table 1.
Relationships between metacognition, mindfulness, and
symptoms
The subscales acting with awareness and nonjudging of
inner experience were the two facets of FFMQ with the
strongest correlation with MCQ. Of these the nonjud-
ging of inner experience dimension correlated most
strongly with two MCQ subscales: negative beliefs about
uncontrollability and need to control thoughts. These re-
lationships, as with most of the associations between
these two questionnaires were negative. They appear to
show that the nonjudging of inner experience decreases
as metacognitive beliefs about the uncontrollability and
danger of thoughts and beliefs about the need to control
thoughts increase. All of the five subscales in MCQ cor-
related positively and significantly (ranging from .23 to
.71) with the symptom measures. The two subscales cor-
relating the most with the three symptom measures
were MCQ uncontrollability and danger and MCQ need
to control thoughts. Four of the subscales in FFMQ cor-
related negatively and significantly (ranging from -.22 to
-.65) with symptoms of emotional disorders while ob-
serving showed non-significant relationship with symp-
toms. The two mindfulness facets with the strongest
correlations with symptoms were acting with awareness
and nonjudging of inner experience.
The relationships between metacognition and mind-
fulness were explored using a Maximum Likelihood
factor analysis in which subscale scores of the MCQ
and the FFMQ were used. The aim of the factor ana-
lysis was to reveallatent constructs amongst the two
sets of subscales. Two factors had eigenvalues above 1
and were extracted and subject to oblimin rotation.
Acting with awareness and nonjudging of inner experi-
ence loaded onto a factor along with and dominated by
the MCQ subscales and therefore appeared to reflect a
metacognition factor. MCQ cognitive self-consciousness
measures a construct primarily related to the first fac-
tor but it had a side-loading on the second factor. Be-
cause the variance is partially related to both factors it
is difficult to interpret in further analyses in this par-
ticular context. The second factor consisted of three
FFMQ subscales (observing, nonreacting to inner
experience, and describing) and was labeled mindful-
ness. Standardized z-scores were used for the analysis
and the FFMQ scales that corresponded with the
metacognition factor were reversed when creating
total scores for the two factors.
Partial correlations were used to examine unique rela-
tions between these latent factors and each symptom
measure while controlling for symptom overlap. The
metacognition factor showed strong zero-order correla-
tions with all of the three symptom measures (ranging
from .65 to .72) and correlations were still significant
after controlling for other symptoms (ranging from .27
to .35). For the mindfulness factor, correlations with
symptoms ranged from -.19 to -.27. Only the relation-
ship with depression emerged as significant when con-
trolling for symptom overlap in the partial correlation
analyses. A summary of the correlation analyses and
Maximum Likelihood factor analysis is presented in
Table 2 and Table 3.
Predictors of psychological symptoms
Two separate factors emerged from the MCQ-30 and
FFMQ in which metacognition could be separated
from mindfulness and metacognition was a stronger
predictor of specific psychological symptoms than
mindfulness. The next step was to determine the in-
dependent predictors of symptoms using hierarchical
regression analysis. We had two aims in doing this,
first to provide some validation of the separate factors
and more specifically test the incremental validity of
mindfulness when controlling for metacognition. Such
Table 1 Levels of mindfulness, metacognitions, and symptoms
(n = 224)
Range Mean SD
MCQ
Positive beliefs about worry 6 - 24 9.16 3.28
Uncontrollability and danger 6 - 24 11.04 4.66
Cognitive confidence 6 - 24 10.82 4.21
Need to control thoughts 6 - 24 9.50 3.88
Cognitive self-consciousness 6 - 24 12.59 3.87
Total 30 - 120 53.11 14.83
FFMQ
Observing 8 - 40 24.25 6.07
Describing 8 - 40 28.89 6.50
Acting with awareness 8 - 40 27.27 5.91
Nonjudging of inner exp. 8 - 40 29.33 7.57
Nonreacting to inner exp. 7 - 35 19.93 5.12
PHQ-9 0 - 27 6.56 5.61
GAD-7 0 - 21 5.32 4.61
OCI-R 0 - 72 10.06 9.78
Note. MCQ Metacognitions Questionnaire, FFMQ Five Facet Mindfulness
Questionnaire, PHQ-9 Patient Health Questionnaire 9-item, GAD-7 Generalized
Anxiety Disorder 7-item, OCI-R Obsessive Compulsive Inventory-Revised
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an analysis also permitted exploration of the individ-
ual predictors of a range of psychological symptoms.
Predictors of anxiety
With GAD-7 as the dependent variable, the regression
analysis revealed that at step one, age and gender ex-
plained 3 % of the variance where age was the significant
predictor. The metacognition factor was entered on step
2 and explained 49 % of the variance in GAD-7 scores.
The mindfulness factor was a non-significant predictor
on step three. In the final step of the equation, metacog-
nition was the only significant individual predictor of
anxiety symptoms. A summary of this regression is pre-
sented in Table 4.
Predictors of depressive symptoms
The regression analysis with PHQ-9 as the dependent
variable showed that at step one, age and gender ex-
plained 2 % with age being the significant predictor.
When entering metacognition on step two an additional
46 % was explained and mindfulness on step 3 added a
further 2 %. In the final step of the equation both meta-
cognition and mindfulness were significant individual
predictors of depressive symptoms. A summary of this
regression is presented in Table 5.
Table 2 Correlations between metacognitive subscales, mindfulness subscales, and symptom measures (n = 224)
MCQ-30
GAD-
7
PHQ-
9
OCI-
R
Positive
beliefs
Negative
beliefs
Cognitive
confidence
Need to control
thoughts
Cognitive self-
consciousness
Total
MCQ-30
Age
GAD-7 .31** .71** .38** .58** .47** .68** -.17**
PHQ-9 .73** .23** .62** .45** .59** .34** .62** -.15*
OCI-R .61** .60** .28** .62** .43** .63** .36** .64** -.11
FFMQ
Observing .10 .04 .04 .15* .07 .07 .08 .38** .20** .07
Describing -.22** -.31** -.28** -.08 -.31** -.32** -.31** .04 -.28** .17**
Awareness -.52** -.60** -.46** -.23** -.47** -.44** -.45** -.30** -.52** .16*
Nonjudging -.65** -.55** -.46** -.37** -.67** -.30** -.63** -.52** -.69** .14*
Nonreact -.36** -.34** -.24** .05 -.35** -.12 -.22** .09 -.17* .04
Age -.21** -.11 -.11 -.18** -.15* -.20**
Note. MCQ Metacognitions Questionnaire, FFMQ Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire, PHQ-9 Patient Health Questionnaire 9-item, GAD-7 Generalized Anxiety
Disorder 7-item, OCI-R Obsessive Compulsive Inventory-Revised. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01
Table 3 Subscale loadings in the factor analysis with Maximum Likelihood and correlations between factors and psychiatric
symptoms
Factor 1 Metacognition Factor 2 Mindfulness
MCQ Uncontrollability and danger .823 -.141
FFMQ Nonjudging of inner exp. -.805 -.050
MCQ Need to control thoughts .789 -.055
FFMQ Acting with awareness -.604 .034
MCQ Positive beliefs .510 .175
MCQ Cognitive confidence .480 -.090
FFMQ Observing .257 .652
FFMQ Nonreacting to inner exp. -.161 .625
FFMQ Describing -.263 .485
Correlations
Zero-order Partial Zero-order Partial
GAD-7 .72** .35** -.21** .03 ns
PHQ-9 .69** .27** -.27** -.18**
OCI-R .65** .32** -.22** -.08 ns
Metacognition -.19**
Note. MCQ Cognitive self-consciousness is not included in the metacognition factor due to side-loading. Partial correlations control for the other symptom measures
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Predictors of obsessive-compulsive symptoms
Age and gender explained 1 % of OCD symptoms. Meta-
cognition on step two added 42 %. Mindfulness on step
three was a non-significant predictor. In the final step of
the equation, metacognition was the only significant in-
dividual predictor of OCD symptoms. A summary of the
regression is presented in Table 6.
Discussion
This study set out to explore the relationship between
metacognitions and mindfulness and to examine how
these constructs might relate to symptoms of depression,
anxiety, and obsessive-compulsive disorder. Results of
correlation analyses showed that metacognition was re-
lated to mindfulness as predicted by metacognitive the-
ory. However, Maximum Likelihood factor analysis
distinguished two clusters of traits. A metacognitive fac-
tor comprised of five MCQ subscales and two FFMQ
subscales, and a narrower mindfulness factor comprised
of three FFMQ subscales with a low side-loading from
MCQ cognitive self-consciousness. The two factors were
independently related to depression symptoms, but only
the metacognition factor was related to anxiety and
OCD symptoms. Metacognition was the strongest pre-
dictor of each set of psychological symptoms with little
additional variance explained by the mindfulness factor.
The negative association between mindfulness and de-
pression scores in the regression suggests that higher de-
pressive symptom levels are associated with lower levels
of reacting, observing and describing events. However,
these mindfulness components might reflect in part the
symptoms of depression such as inactivity or disengage-
ment from the environment. Further work is required to
determine the distinctness of the mindfulness factor
from depressive symptoms.
The Maximum Likelihood factor analysis revealed
that metacognitive traits can be distinguished from
mindfulness with three out of five mindfulness sub-
scales (observing, nonreacting to inner experience and
describing) showing weak relationships with metacog-
nition. The metacognition factor had substantial load-
ings for all MCQ subscales with negative beliefs
predominating. The negative loading of nonjudging of
inner experience on the metacognition factor suggests
that the tendency to evaluate one’s thoughts and feel-
ings are more closely associated with metacognitive
beliefs than with mindfulness. This pattern of findings
supports a central assertion of the metacognitive
model, that a syndrome of entanglement with think-
ing and analyzing events is linked to specific forms of
metacognitive knowledge. It would seem that other
dimensions of mindfulness (observing, nonreacting to
inner experience, and describing) which are features
of meditation practice may be only weakly related to
the ideational processes that are considered most
problematic in the metacognitive model. Nonreacting
to inner experience was part of the mindfulness factor.
Some nonreacting to inner experience items describe
emotions and situations and how the person responds
to them, whereas MCQ items refer to metacognitive
Table 4 Hierarchical regression analysis with GAD-7 as
dependent variable (n = 224)
F cha R2 cha β t
Step 1 3.61* .03
Gender .05 .67
Age -.17 −2.62**
Step 2 Metacognition 221.60*** .49 .71 14.89***
Step 3 Mindfulness 1.57 .00
Gender .03 .65
Age -.03 -.63
Metacognition .70 14.35***
Mindfulness -.06 −1.25
Note. GAD-7 Generalized Anxiety Disorder 7-item. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,
*** p < 0.001
Table 5 Hierarchical regression analysis with PHQ-9 as dependent
variable (n = 224)
F cha R2 cha β t
Step 1 2.69 .02
Gender .04 .55
Age -.15 −2.26*
Step 2 Metacognition 191.91*** .46 .69 13.85***
Step 3 Mindfulness 9.95** .02
Gender .04 .75
Age .01 .13
Metacognition .66 13.35***
Mindfulness -.16 −3.15**
Note. PHQ-9 Patient Health Questionnaire 9-item. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,
*** p < .001
Table 6 A multiple hierarchical regression analysis with OCI-R as
dependent variable (n = 224)
F cha R2 cha β t
Step 1 1.45 .01
Gender -.03 -.41
Age -.11 −1.65
Step 2 Metacognition 162.11*** .42 .66 12.73***
Step 3 Mindfulness 2.97 .01
Gender -.04 -.75
Age .04 .67
Metacognition .65 12.28***
Mindfulness -.09 −1.72
Note. OCI-R Obsessive Compulsive Inventory-Revised.
*** p < .001
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knowledge, meaning knowledge about cognitions (not
emotions/situations) and not about the person’s be-
havioral responses to them. These differences could
explain why nonreacting to inner experience is not a
part of the metacognition factor.
Acting with awareness also loaded negatively on the
metacognition factor. The acting with awareness subscale
appears to assess the ability to attend to what one is doing
with items suggesting a good resistance to distraction.
This loading is also parsimonious with the metacognitive
model of emotional vulnerability, where the pattern of ex-
tended thinking (the cognitive attentional syndrome) that
contributes to disorder is associated with reduced atten-
tional flexibility (Wells and Matthews 1994, 1996). More-
over, the result is consistent with the use in metacognitive
therapy of techniques such as attention training (Wells
1990) which is designed to increase flexibility and aware-
ness of control.
Whilst the metacognitive dimension of cognitive self-
consciousness loaded most highly on metacognition it
also loaded on mindfulness. Examination of the bivariate
subscale correlations reveals that this association is the
result of shared variance with observing as there was no
correlation with the other constituents of the mindful-
ness factor (nonreacting to inner experience, describing).
Observing assesses the tendency to focus on thoughts,
feelings and behaviors and therefore overlaps in content
with cognitive self-consciousness which is the tendency to
focus on thinking processes.
The mindfulness factor was composed of FFMQ
subscales (observing, nonreacting to inner experience,
describing) involving the concept of focusing on present-
moment experience in an accepting way. This factor cor-
responds well to the definition of mindfulness presented
in Buddhist-related applications (e.g. Kabat-Zinn 2003),
but these features do not appear to be closely associated
with psychological vulnerability. In contrast, metacogni-
tion was positively associated with each of the dimen-
sions of psychological disorder symptoms measured and
remained an independent predictor of all symptoms on
the final step of the analysis. In contrast, mindfulness ex-
plained a small amount of additional variance in depres-
sion symptoms but not anxiety or OCD symptoms.
In summary, the present analysis indicated that the ex-
tent to which mindfulness is linked to maladaptation
largely reflects metacognition. Specifically, higher nega-
tive beliefs about the uncontrollability and danger of
thoughts and beliefs about the need for control loaded
with high levels of nonjudging of inner experience and
high levels of acting with awareness. Of the two emer-
gent factors metacognition showed the strongest associ-
ation with symptoms of psychological disorder. This
factor corresponds to the Wells and Matthews (1994)
metacognitive model of psychological disorder in which
metacognitive beliefs coupled with extended conceptual
processing and threat monitoring (the CAS) are central
to emotional disorder. The results support the call to
examine the structure and nature of mindfulness within
the context of metacognitive theory (Wells, 2005) with a
view to advancing the construct within a well specified
psychological model.
Strengths and limitations
The present study is innovative in examining how meta-
cognitive traits relate to mindfulness constructs. The
study used validated measures possessing good psycho-
metric properties. A systematic review of instruments to
measure self-reported mindfulness found that the FFMQ
has the best psychometric properties (Park et al. 2013).
However, there have also been criticisms of the scale
(e.g. Van Dam et al. 2012) such as problems with com-
bining positively and negatively worded items. Future
studies should thus continue developing and improving
the assessment of mindfulness.
Whilst the sample size was reasonable for this type of
analysis, the cross-sectional nature of the data means
that inferences about causality cannot be made. The data
used was based on self-report, which means that it may
have been biased by selective memory, personal experi-
ence and social desirability. For example, meditators and
non-meditators complete the FFMQ differently (van
Dam et al. 2009). It may be relevant to explore this in
future studies. Also, the study did not measure detached
mindfulness as described in Wells’ metacognitive theory.
As such the study cannot address the relationship be-
tween mindfulness and detached mindfulness.
Measures of anxiety and depression were chosen as
symptom measures because they are the most frequent
emotional disorders in the population. A measure of
OCD was also included as mindfulness and metacogni-
tions have been implicated as important in OCD, how-
ever, other measures of other emotional disorders could
have been included as well and a measure of global
functioning would be a reasonable addition to the
study. To ease burden on participants we chose to in-
clude a few brief symptom measures. Future studies
should look into the relationship between mindfulness
and metacognition on other symptom measures as well
as measures of global functioning.
A major limitation is that convenience sampling was
used and limited information about the sample is avail-
able, for example we do not know if any of the partici-
pants were treatment seeking. The uncertainty with
regard to the representativeness of the sample means that
we do not know if the latent structure of relationships be-
tween subscales applies in a clinical group. Several vari-
ables showed significant skewness and kurtosis and
generally this would indicate that the results of the
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analyses should be interpreted with some caution. A single
study does not implicate changes to theories of treatment.
However, if further studies replicate the findings from our
study using patient populations and more rigorous de-
signs, there would be indications as to which components
of mindfulness and metacognitions are most important to
address in therapy.
Conclusions
In conclusion, the results of the present study suggest
that mindfulness and metacognition traits as assessed by
the FFMQ and MCQ-30 can be described by two latent
factors. A large metacognition factor that correspond
with the Wells and Matthews (1994) metacognitive model
of dysfunctional processing and a smaller mindfulness fac-
tor that corresponds more with Buddhist-based concep-
tions of an experiential stance of observational acceptance.
Psychological disorder symptoms were most strongly asso-
ciated with the metacognition factor with little or no con-
tribution made by mindfulness. These results imply that
mindfulness as assessed by constructs such as the FFMQ
is rather heterogeneous in its constituent parts, a result
that is consistent with definitions of the construct that ap-
pear to combine attention and cognitive control (metacog-
nition) with a direct experience and acceptance of the
present. However, some of the most characteristic and
unique feature of mindfulness; focusing on present moment
experience may well be the least important from the per-
spective of psychological wellbeing. The results under-
score the need for a greater psychological theory informed
analysis.
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